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Abstract 
The term ‘Westminster model’, widely used in both the academic and practitioner literature, is a 
familiar one. But detailed examination finds significant confusion about its meaning. This paper follows 
Giovanni Sartori’s advice for ‘reconstructing’ a social science term whose meaning may be unclear 
through review of its use in the recent literature. It finds that many authors in comparative politics use 
the term ‘Westminster model’ without definition, while those providing definitions associate it with a 
large (and sometimes conflicting) set of attributes, and a set of countries often not demonstrating 
those attributes. Some have sought to respect this diversity by proposing variants like “Washminster” 
or “Eastminster”, while others suggest that the term should be seen as a loose ‘family resemblance’ 
concept. But on examination it no longer meets even the – relatively weak – requirements for family 
resemblance. To end the muddle, and the risk of flawed inferences and false generalisation, 
comparative scholars should drop this term, and select cases based on more precise attributes instead. 
 
 
Introduction  
The term ‘Westminster model’ appears frequently both in the academic and practitioner literature, 
and will be familiar to many specialists in comparative politics, public administration and law. But what 
precisely does it mean, and is there consistency in its application? If put under the microscope, can 
any clear meaning actually be discerned? This paper suggests that while ostensibly serving as a ‘model’ 
in the comparative literature, the term instead risks inducing muddle and unclear thinking.  
 
Following Giovanni Sartori’s advice for ‘reconstructing’ a social science term whose meaning may be 
unclear, our paper analyses uses of the term ‘Westminster model’ and its equivalents in the academic 
literature since 1999. We find that, while the term occurs frequently in comparative texts, authors’ 
interpretations of it are often unclear. Definitions are often absent, and where present, they are 
frequently partial, divergent, and sometimes even mutually contradictory. If a dominant 
interpretation exists, this is probably of a majoritarian parliamentary system – but such use is far from 
universal. Far better, if focusing on such systems, to state this explicitly. Too frequently scholars’ use 
of the term implies that empirical findings in single country or small-n studies have broader scope – 
which risks feeding flawed inferences and encouraging false generalisation. In order to avoid this, and 
to bring greater clarity to debates, we propose that the ‘Westminster model’ should now be retired 
from comparative politics – and more precise terms, based on the specific variables of interest, be put 
in its place. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we summarise the roots and general uses of the term 
‘Westminster model’, which began as a descriptor in British politics, but developed over time to take 
on a more widely comparative use. We then review the literature on concept formation in political 
science, to consider the reasonable expectations for a useful political science term. Next, we briefly 
outline our methods. The substantive part of the paper is then structured around three key questions. 
First, to what extent do authors define the Westminster model at all? Second, where it is defined, 
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what are its suggested meanings and how much consistency exists? Third, having determined (as far 
as is possible) what the Westminster model is thought to mean, where is it considered to apply? We 
find that the countries commonly cited in the literature have relatively few key attributes in common, 
while sharing some important attributes with countries not normally associated with the model. 
Finally, we conclude, suggesting that the Westminster model fails the test for a classical political 
science concept, as well as the relatively weak requirements for a ‘family resemblance’ concept. It 
hence risks creating more confusion than illumination.  
 
Origins of the Westminster model 
The term ‘Westminster model’ is linked by various authors to Walter Bagehot’s (2001[1867]) 
exposition of the ‘English’ constitution (e.g. Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009). It didn't actually appear 
in his text, but served – at least initially – as a convenient label for the system that he described. 
Subsequently it came increasingly to be used in a comparative context to describe countries 
influenced by the British system. It is now often deployed by comparativists to imply that there is a 
set of ‘Westminster model countries’ (e.g. Pinto-Duchinsky 1999), ‘Westminster democracies’ (e.g. 
Brenton 2014; Grube 2011; Kaiser 2008), countries adhering to a ‘Westminster system’ (e.g. Eggers 
and Spirling 2016; Estevez-Abe 2006) or indeed members of a ‘Westminster family’ (e.g. Eichbaum 
and Shaw 2007: 613; Mulgan 2008: 457; Paun 2011: 452). 
 
Yet a superficial reading of recent comparative literature suggests at least some confusion about what 
the term actually means. The Oxford English Dictionary offers little clue: the term ‘Westminster model’ 
appears only once, within the more generic entry for ‘Westminster’, citing a classic text by De Smith 
(1961) on ‘Westminster’s export models’. This is not necessarily its earliest use, but a search of Google 
books since publication of Bagehot’s text shows that references grew sharply in the early 1960s (Figure 
1). De Smith (1961: 3) himself took care to point out that ‘[t]he Westminster model will never be a 
legal term of art, and the political scientist may wish to handle it circumspectly’. But this clearly did 
little to discourage its subsequent popularity. Another classic text, J. P. Mackintosh’s ‘The Government 
and Politics of Britain’, whose first edition was published in 1970, used the ‘Westminster model’ as a 
framing device. For Mackintosh (1970: 28) it described ‘the idealised version of British government in 
the 1880-1914 period’; but he suggested that even then it had been an imperfect descriptor, while 
subsequent changes meant it had developed significant ability to ‘mislead’. Mackintosh however 
noted that the ‘model’ had been exported. His own writing may have inadvertently contributed to its 
increased comparative use. 
 
Figure 1: Occurrence of the term ‘Westminster model’ in English language texts published  
1867 – 2008 and captured on Google books 
 
 
 
Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer (http://books.google.com/ngrams), generated 11 February 2019.1 
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More recently, the notion of the Westminster model was boosted through the attention of 
comparativist Arend Lijphart. Lijphart’s now classic text Democracies (1984, with around 5000 Google 
scholar citations), and its later revision as Patterns of Democracy (1999/2012, at over 10,000), 
proposed a distinction between two ideal types: ‘majoritarian democracies’ on the one hand, versus 
‘consensus democracies’ on the other. Lijphart used the term ‘majoritarian democracy’ 
interchangeably with ‘Westminster model’, and cited Britain as ‘both the original and the best-known 
example of this model’ (1999: 9). His well-known system was based on 10 indicators: five on the 
‘executive-parties’ dimension (e.g. electoral system, party system, presence or absence of coalition 
government) and five on the ‘federal-unitary’ dimension (e.g. degree of territorial decentralisation 
and presence or absence of bicameralism). In some respects this intervention added a degree of 
precision to a previously rather loose term. And yet – at Lijphart’s own admission – his ideal type did 
not precisely apply in any country. For example, he associated unicameralism with majoritarian 
democracy, while Britain has a bicameral parliament – albeit with a second chamber he judged to be 
weak. 
 
An alternative approach taken by some interpretivist scholars is to view the ‘Westminster model’ as a 
more cultural and historical phenomenon. Most notably Patapan, Wanna and Weller (2005), and 
Rhodes, Wanna and Weller (2009) have explored ‘Westminster legacies’, particularly in Asia and the 
Pacific region. Their review of various texts, from De Smith to 2002, concluded that the term 
encompassed various constitutional features and beliefs, and had various functions: serving for 
example as an ‘institutional category’, ‘legitimizing tradition’ or ‘political tool’ (ibid: 8). They explicitly 
ruled out developing ‘a set of institutions that can be established as an ideal model, against which the 
degrees of deviance [from the model] can be calculated for each country’, considering this a ‘possible 
but… rather sterile’ exercise (ibid: 224). Patapan, Wanna and Weller (2005: 2) proposed instead that 
the ‘Westminster model… provides a set of beliefs and a shared inheritance’.  
 
But for works following a more positivist tradition in political science this seems problematic. In 
particular, the term is frequently used (as seen below) to select cases for comparative analysis. Under 
this logic it will be used to draw – or at least imply – generalised conclusions. If comparative scholars 
frequently deploy a term with unclear or multiple meanings, this hence risks feeding flawed 
descriptive and causal inferences. In part driven by similar concerns, various other terms have been 
put under the microscope in recent years. For example, Judge (2003: 501) questioned the utility of the 
term legislative ‘institutionalisation’, arguing that on examination of the literature ‘there is little 
agreement as to exactly what its defining core characteristics are’. Berger (2009: 335) suggested that 
the term ‘civic engagement’ should ‘meet a well-deserved end’, in favour of more precise alternatives. 
Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg (2014) used Comparative Constitutions Project data to challenge 
assumptions about the attributes commonly associated with presidentialism and parliamentarism. 
What links these exercises is a combination of rigorous analysis of concepts with empirical study, 
including treating the literature itself as data. The Westminster model seems long overdue such a test. 
 
Concepts in political science  
A valuable starting point in considering concepts in comparative political analysis is the widely-cited 
text by Sartori (1970). This set out requirements for classical political science concepts, introducing 
the key notions of conceptual ‘travelling’ (across time and space), and conceptual ‘stretching’ (to 
enable a concept to remain relevant to increasingly disparate cases). Connectedly, Sartori highlighted 
the relationship between the ‘extension’ of a term (to different cases), and its ‘intension’, defined as 
the ‘collection of properties which determine the things to which the [term] applies’ (1970: 1041, 
quoting Salmon 1963, italics in original). These two things can often be in conflict: extending a term’s 
use more widely may put its intension under strain. Sartori suggested that conceptual stretching could 
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be avoided by ascending his well-known ‘ladder of abstraction’, to instead deploy a more general 
concept. Such considerations remain core to judging the essential attributes needed for political 
science concepts to be ‘good’ (Gerring 1999). 
 
In later work, Sartori made proposals for rigorous testing of concepts, and particularly for 
‘reconstruction’ of categories whose meaning had become unclear. He suggested that ‘[c]oncept 
reconstruction is a highly needed therapy for the current state of chaos of most social sciences’, and 
proposed a three stage process to achieve this. ‘[F]irst collect a representative set of definitions; 
second, extract their characteristics; and third, construct matrices that organize such characteristics 
meaningfully’ (2009 [1984]: 122, 116). Hence the key is ‘reconstructing a concept from its literature’ 
(ibid: 121, italics in original). We take our cue from this suggestion. 
 
It is important, however, to note that not all concepts are equal, and some require more parsimonious 
definition than others. Sartori was interested in ‘classical categorization, in which the relation among 
categories is understood in terms of a taxonomic hierarchy of successively more general categories’ 
(Collier and Mahon 1993: 145). A widely-noted alternative to this is the ‘family resemblance’ idea. 
Here, cases share a set of properties, but not all cases share them all. As Goertz (2006: 36) articulated, 
whereas a classical category requires members to share n attributes, ‘the family resemblance rule 
almost always takes the form of “m of n”’. Given the notion of a ‘Westminster family’, this logic might 
seem suited to the Westminster model. Indeed some authors (e.g. Patapan, Wanna and Weller 2005) 
have proposed this. We return to such suggestions towards the end of the paper. 
 
Methods and data  
Given the centrality of the term ‘Westminster model’ in Lijphart’s 1999 book, and the need to delimit 
our dataset, we began our search for meaning through an analysis of the academic literature starting 
at that point. Our endpoint is January 2017.  
 
Our search was primarily based on academic bibliographic databases, using English language texts.2 
We began with Scopus, using the set of largely interchangeable terms frequently found in the 
literature: ‘Westminster model’, ‘Westminster system’, ‘Westminster democracy’ and ‘Westminster 
parliamentary democracy’. We searched for these in the item’s abstract or keywords, or for the single 
word ‘Westminster’ within its title. This found over 150 items, of which around one-third were 
excluded as irrelevant – because they were not substantive articles, or discussed topics largely 
unrelated to political science, or used the term Westminster purely literally (e.g. articles on the 
Westminster parliament which mentioned no such ‘model’, ‘system’, etc). This search was repeated 
for the JSTOR database and on Google scholar, with duplicates removed. Altogether these searches 
resulted in 215 items, of which the great majority (202) were journal articles. 
 
Such database searches will tend to overlook definitions embedded in books, while core texts could 
be important to the dissemination of a popular term. We hence also conducted searches of university 
reading lists. Selecting the top 10 political science departments in US universities and top five 
equivalents in the UK (based on QS World University Rankings), we identified core recommended texts 
from broad-based undergraduate and postgraduate taught courses in comparative politics. Where 
reading lists were not available online, we requested these from course tutors. In addition, building 
inductively on our analysis of extension (see below) we did the same for broad-based domestic politics 
courses from the same UK universities, and the top three in each of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. This resulted in 27 textbooks, which were carefully searched (on paper if not available 
electronically). Excluding items that did not mention the term, this brought our total number of texts 
to 239. Of these, 90 were texts broadly in comparative politics, 67 focused on British politics, and the 
remaining 82 were single-country studies focused elsewhere than the UK. It is the comparative and 
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non-UK texts that interest us most, and which particularly inform the analysis below; but the UK-
related texts are clearly also important in establishing public understandings of the term. 
 
All texts were independently coded by two researchers, with a third adjudicating in cases of 
disagreement. We searched first for definitions of the Westminster model, second for attributes 
associated with it by the author(s), and third for countries to which the author(s) suggested it applied. 
Regarding definitions, all three researchers worked from a codebook developed deductively at the 
outset, with some initial refinement by the first coder. For attributes, categories were developed 
inductively from the data by the first coder, then refined (e.g. merging and splitting of categories) in 
consultation in the team, before second and third coding. The association of countries with the model 
in different texts was uncontroversial, and completed by the first coder only. 
 
To what extent is the Westminster model defined?  
The initial task was hence to search the 239 texts to determine whether or not they defined the 
Westminster model (or ‘Westminster system’, ‘Westminster [parliamentary] democracy’). The results 
are shown in Table 1. A definition was taken to be an explicit statement setting out what the author(s) 
in question considered to be the meaning of the term.3  
 
Table 1: Types of definition of the Westminster model, by scope of publication 
 
Type of definition Comparative UK Other single 
country case 
study 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
No definition 31 34% 14 21% 26 32% 71 30% 
Implicit  36 40% 19 28% 35 43% 90 38% 
Partial definition 10 11% 19 28% 11 13% 40 17% 
Full definition 13 14% 15 22% 10 12% 38 16% 
TOTAL 90 100% 67 100% 82 100% 239 100% 
 
We assigned each text to one of four categories, according to whether it contained a definition, and 
how complete this was. Only texts in the third and fourth categories (‘partial’ and ‘full’) actually 
contained a definition in the form just indicated. Combined, these accounted for only one third of the 
total texts - i.e. 78 out of 239. The remaining two-thirds of texts did not provide anything that could 
be considered a clear statement of meaning. Definitions were far more common in UK-focused studies 
(50%) compared to comparative studies and texts dealing with other single country cases (both 25%). 
These latter groups collectively make up over 70% of the dataset. 
 
The lack of clear definitions in many non-UK texts suggests that comparativists frequently assume the 
Westminster model to have a well-understood meaning. The most striking group of texts were those 
(representing 30% of the overall total) offering absolutely no definition at all. For example, one article 
proposed ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster Parliaments’, 
but the only clue as to what a ‘Westminster parliament’ might be was the article's focus on Britain and 
Australia (Monk 2010). Another piece discussed ‘three Westminster parliamentary democracies, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand’, with the only expansion being that these were ‘Westminster-
derived judicial systems’ (Kerby and Banfield 2014: 342). The term ‘Westminster model’ (or similar) 
was hence often used in broadly comparative texts to imply presence of a well-defined sampling 
strategy, and in single country studies to suggest that this was representative of a wider set of cases, 
without any overt rationale being provided. In many UK texts, in contrast, the term was simply used 
to describe the domestic context, without necessarily implying a comparative meaning. 
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Texts including an explicit definition or no definition offer two clear categories – but the largest group 
(38%) were those containing ‘implicit’ definitions, where the Westminster model was mentioned in 
combination with certain attributes or consequences, without clearly indicating that these 
contributed to its definition. Again, understanding of the term by these authors seemed to be taken 
as read. As explored further below, the attributes mentioned in this context were quite diverse. For 
example Hopkin and Bradbury (2006: 143) suggested that ‘the “Westminster model” of majoritarian 
party competition has traditionally placed a premium on party cohesion’, while Hix and Noury (2016: 
252) agreed that ‘the Westminster model assumes that parties can enforce legislative cohesion’. 
Bittner and Koop noted how ‘[i]t is commonly assumed that majority governments are natural and 
proper in a Westminster parliamentary system’ (2013: 48). Instead Aucoin (2012: 177) noted that a 
‘public service staffed independently of ministers on the basis of merit has long been a central feature 
of the Westminster model of public administration’.  
 
Explicit definitions of a ‘partial’ kind shared some characteristics with these examples; they did include 
a distinct statement of meaning, but it was often far from complete. Some simply used a cross-
reference to other work (often Lijphart) where a full definition could be found. For example Hendriks 
and Michels (2011:307) referred to Britain as ‘a strong example of majoritarian “Westminster 
democracy”’, compared to the Netherlands which ‘shows strong characteristics of non-majoritarian 
“consensus democracy” (Lijphart, 1999)’. Other cases defined the Westminster model explicitly 
through reference to one or more attributes, without indicating whether this definition was intended 
to be complete. Hence Estevez-Abe wrote of ‘a Westminster system that centralizes power in the 
hands of the party leadership and prime minister’ (2006: 633).  
 
As might be anticipated, textbooks using the term tended to work harder to define it than other texts. 
Hence in a British context Flinders (2006: 133) referred to the ‘pillars of the Westminster model’ being 
parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial responsibility, while going on to list various additional 
features. Other British politics textbooks likewise provided quite complete definitions (e.g. Kavanagh 
et al. 2006; Leach, Coxall and Robins 2011). A New Zealand textbook claimed that the core of the 
model was ‘a centralised or unitary state’, supported by four other ‘interlocking variables that 
contribute to this centralisation of political power’, which it listed (Miller 2015: 32). Quite often full 
definitions, like the partial definitions cited above, deferred to other authors (most commonly 
Lijphart), reproducing lists of attributes drawn from their texts. 
 
Intension: where the Westminster model is defined, what meaning is it given?  
Our first finding is therefore that the term ‘Westminster model’ is far from universally clarified by 
authors who deploy it, particularly in comparative politics – though some detailed and fairly complete 
definitions do exist. However, we have already seen that there is diversity among the attributes that 
authors associate with the model, while some of those who have paid it the most careful attention 
emphasise the slippery or contested nature of the term. 
 
Having identified 168 texts which offer some indication of attributes associated with the model 
(whether as part of a full, partial or implicit definition), we can explore the diversity of these attributes, 
and the extent of agreement over which ones apply. That is, following Sartori, to investigate the 
‘intension’ of the term. Table 2 lists the commonest attributes identified in these 168 texts, rank 
ordered by overall prominence, and categorised according to the fullness of definition. As already 
indicated, attributes were coded inductively and as far as possible based on the original authors’ 
words, but subsequently grouped into categories where these references fairly clearly had the same 
meaning (see examples under the table). 
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The attributes listed are diverse, and the boundaries between them sometimes blurred. As in Lijphart’s 
version of the model, some attributes (such as a two-party system and single-party majority 
government) are clearly interlinked. Others (e.g. executive dominance, or adversarial political culture) 
would be difficult to define or measure precisely, and are closer to being consequences of the model 
than institutional rules. Notably, the table also demonstrates some direct contradiction: eight texts 
(primarily in an application of Lijphart) considered unicameralism or quasi-unicameralism to be part 
of the model, while six authors instead associated it with bicameralism. For example Anckar (2007: 
641) stated that Caribbean ‘[c]ountries that adopted at independence the bicameral method are 
Westminster countries; others are not’. 
 
Table 2: Attributes associated with the Westminster model, by type of definition 
 
 Implicit Partial Full Total 
Attribute N %  N %  N % N % 
First-past-the-post electoral system 16 18% 14 35% 17 45% 47 28% 
Parliamentary system 23 26% 10 25% 11 29% 44 26% 
Parliamentary sovereignty 11 12% 12 30% 21 55% 44 26% 
Single-party majority government 17 19% 11 28% 15 39% 43 26% 
Two party system 11 12% 8 20% 18 47% 37 22% 
Neutral civil service 15 17% 4 10% 18 47% 37 22% 
Cabinet government 9 10% 8 20% 15 39% 32 19% 
Executive dominance 9 10% 11 28% 12 32% 32 19% 
Individual ministerial responsibility 15 17% 4 10% 9 24% 28 17% 
Centralised government 6 7% 8 20% 12 32% 26 15% 
Unitary state 4 4% 7 18% 12 32% 23 14% 
Adversarial political culture 14 16% 5 13% 4 11% 23 14% 
Strong party discipline 14 16% 3 8% 2 5% 19 11% 
Executive drawn from the legislature 4 4% 6 15% 6 16% 16 10% 
Institutionalised opposition 3 3% 1 3% 10 26% 14 8% 
Collective cabinet responsibility 3 3% 4 10% 6 16% 13 8% 
Unicameral parliament 0 0% 4 10% 4 11% 8 5% 
Bicameral parliament 2 2% 2 5% 2 5% 6 4% 
Total number of texts 90 (100%) 40 (100%) 38 (100%) 168 (100%) 
Average no. of attributes per text 1.9 3 5.1 2.9 
 
Definitions: first-past-the-post includes references to single-member plurality, but not simply to ‘majoritarian’ system; 
parliamentary system includes indication executive is dependent on legislative confidence; single-party majority 
government excludes texts referring only to one of these attributes; neutral civil service includes similar terms such as 
‘impartial’; strong party discipline includes reference to strong/high party ‘cohesion’; executive drawn from the 
legislature includes reference to ministers sitting in parliament. 
 
Despite the imperfect nature of the categories, the table provides some clear indications of attributes 
most commonly associated with the model. Texts hinting at intension while falling short of a definition 
referred on average to just under two attributes, the most common of which was being a 
parliamentary system. Perhaps surprisingly, this attribute was not the most frequently mentioned 
among texts containing explicit definitions – though the countries cited as conforming to the model 
(discussed below) were almost exclusively parliamentary. The omission of this seemingly central 
attribute from many explicit definitions is partly attributable to Lijphart’s interpretation, which 
eschewed the established dichotomy between parliamentary and presidential systems, to suggest a 
different dividing line between majoritarian and consensus democracies. Texts citing Lijphart hence 
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often omitted this attribute. However, various other texts did so as well – perhaps considering it too 
obvious to mention.  
 
The association between the Westminster model and parliamentarism is sufficiently strong that 
various authors took one as a pseudonym for the other. Hence Bari (2007: 2) suggested that Malaysia 
is ‘a Westminster democracy – which is also known as parliamentary democracy’. The Westminster 
model was often defined against an alternative of US-style presidentialism; for example, a Canadian 
text discussed ‘the contrast between a presidential/congressional political system and a Westminster 
parliamentary system: power concentrated versus power dispersed’ (Simeon and Radin 2010: 7). 
Discussing South Africa, one author suggested that ‘[d]espite the apparent unsuitability of the 
Westminster model, the opposite model of a clear separation of powers has never been a serious 
alternative’ (Nijzinc 2001: 54).  
 
The Westminster model is hence often presented as an archetypal parliamentary system. 
Nonetheless, some authors take care to address the diversity of such systems, instead presenting it as 
an archetype amongst them. For Strøm, Narud and Valen (2005: 782), ‘[p]arliamentary democracy 
comes in many forms, but one of the most venerable and influential is the Westminster model’. 
Norton (2014: 269) expanded, suggesting that ‘[t]here are two basic types of parliamentary 
government: the Westminster parliamentary system and the continental’ – where the former ‘stresses 
single-party government, elected normally through a first-past-the-post electoral system’, and the 
latter ‘places stress on consensus politics‘. Nijzinc (2001: 55) also acknowledged this distinction, noting 
that ‘[i]n addition to the presidential-parliamentary contrast between fusion and separation of 
powers, there is a further important difference between Westminster’s executive dominance and the 
continental European pattern of executive-legislative balance‘. 
 
Texts containing full definitions mentioned on average just over five different attributes. The most 
frequent amongst them (identified by a little over half such texts) was parliamentary sovereignty, and 
its corollary of an unwritten constitution. This was another of the highest ranking attributes overall, 
and mentioned particularly frequently in the UK texts. Hence Mitchell (2010: 101) indicated that ‘[a]t 
its core, the Westminster model focuses on the centralised nature of power legitimated through a 
popularised version of Dicey’s doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty’. But the attribute also appeared 
fairly frequently in non-UK texts. Thus Palmer and Palmer (2004: 596), writing in a New Zealand 
context, suggested that ‘Westminster systems of government… [are] founded… on a bedrock doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty that, in theory, privileges the legislature over all else, including the 
judicial branch of government’. Harding (2004), in a broad comparative text, proposed that this 
feature was at the heart of the model.  
 
Table 2 demonstrates how there is no single attribute which authors explicitly agree characterises the 
Westminster model. But purely quantitatively, the contest is narrowly won by a country's possession 
of a first-past-the-post electoral system – cited in just under a third of all texts. For example Vowles 
(2000: 684) suggested that first-past-the-post is ‘[o]ne of the deepest foundations of the Westminster 
model’. Some authors, indeed, treated the model as synonymous not with parliamentarism, but with 
this. In an article focused on electoral systems, Pinto-Duchinsky (1999: 116) stated that in Britain ‘the 
current method of election [is] by first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies (the 
Westminster model)’, and used this to suggest that ‘the Westminster Model is used in 62 countries 
and by 49% of the world’s electors’ (ibid). This electoral system is clearly closely linked to other very 
widely cited features – including a two-party system and single-party majority governments. Likewise 
these are connected to less tangible attributes such as executive dominance – for example described 
as ‘a strong executive authority’ (Burgess 1999: 3) or ‘executive supremacy’ (Gamble 2003: 20).  
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Instead, for a different set of authors, focused on public administration, the central feature of the 
Westminster model was a neutral civil service. Hence Miller (2006: 259) pointed out that in New 
Zealand, ‘[i]n the Westminster tradition officials are presumed to be non-partisan servants of the 
Crown’. Likewise Richards and Smith (2004: 783) emphasised that the ‘Westminster model sees 
officials as neutral, permanent and loyal’. As with electoral systems, some such texts referred to no 
other attributes beyond civil service neutrality and ministerial responsibility in indicating the model’s 
meaning. But these attributes were also frequently mentioned in other texts.  
 
Connected to the notion of executive dominance, various authors emphasised the importance of 
centralisation to the Westminster model. For example Flinders (2011: 2) pointed to a ‘centralising 
ethos [and] power-hoarding logic’. One key manifestation of this is the expectation of a unitary rather 
than a federal state – cited in around one third of texts containing a full definition, in part due to its 
inclusion in Lijphart’s schema. 
 
A number of authors also highlighted party behaviour in the legislature. In a single country case study 
based on the UK, Eggers and Spirling (2016: 20) echoed comments cited above when suggesting that 
‘[s]trong party discipline is a defining feature of legislative politics in Westminster systems’. Similarly, 
in a broad comparative text, Hix and Noury (2011: 7) suggested that a Westminster model of legislative 
politics is underpinned by a governing party ‘which can enforce Party cohesion in votes… [with] the 
main weapon [being] the threat of a vote-of-confidence’. This again suggests some blurring between 
Westminster systems and parliamentary systems more broadly – and perhaps implicitly a comparator 
of US presidentialism.  
 
This analysis of the Westminster model’s ‘intension’, in terms of the features most commonly 
associated with it, provides a somewhat confusing picture. Most features listed present a fairly 
accurate account of the traditions of UK government. But whether they describe a ‘model’ with real 
comparative application remains distinctly moot.  
 
Extension: where is the Westminster model thought to apply?  
We can shed more light on this question by exploring the ‘extension’ of the Westminster model: i.e. 
the countries to which authors suggest that it applies. Here, all 239 texts in the dataset (i.e. including 
those containing no definition) were included in the analysis. In total, 35 countries were mentioned, 
but many no more than a handful of times.4 The top 10 countries identified are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Countries most commonly identified as conforming to the Westminster model 
 
Country Number of texts 
UK 196 
Canada 77 
Australia 67 
New Zealand 67 
India 13 
Trinidad and Tobago 12 
Jamaica 11 
Guyana 10 
Barbados 10 
Ireland 9 
 
Unsurprisingly, the country almost universally mentioned is the UK. References to Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand were also particularly frequent. Notably, and again unsurprisingly, all of the 
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countries listed in the table (and most of those included in footnote 3) have a British colonial heritage 
and are (with the exception of Ireland) Commonwealth members. This immediately suggests a 
common linkage of shared cultural history. To a greater or lesser extent, these countries adopted 
institutions long ago which were influenced by UK traditions. But today, are there tangible common 
attributes that apply to these countries, which could in any sense imply a ‘model’ of government? 
 
Fifty years ago, Mackintosh (1970) already considered the ‘Westminster model’ an imperfect fit for 
Victorian Britain, which had since become an increasingly unreliable guide. Recent years have seen 
continued lively debates among British politics scholars about the extent to which the UK can be said 
to conform to the model. Various factors have contributed to these doubts – for example Britain’s 
accession to the EU in the 1970s raised significant questions about parliamentary sovereignty. But the 
largest cause for reflection has been the programme of reform introduced by the Labour governments 
of 1997-2010, which included territorial devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, partial 
reform of the House of Lords, and the introduction of a Human Rights Act. Authors have respectively 
suggested that these introduced ‘quasi federalism’ (Gamble 2006: 22), stronger bicameralism (Russell 
2013), and greater judicialisation (Bevir 2008). Subsequent to this, the 2010 general election resulted 
in a coalition government, ending a period of single-party governments previously uninterrupted since 
1945; the election of 2017 later resulted in a single-party minority government. Even before all of this 
had played out, authors such as Flinders (2005, 2009) and Hazell (2008) had sought systematically to 
assess constitutional change against Lijphart’s articulation of the Westminster model, acknowledging 
at least some shift. Norris (2001: 881) was an early exponent of such views, arguing that constitutional 
change had moved the UK away from the Westminster model, and that its system was ‘becoming 
more like the political systems in Australia and Canada’. 
 
This latter comment implies that other frequently-cited countries do not conform to a shared pattern 
either, and that there is diversity among supposed ‘Westminster model' countries. In fact, as Wanna 
(2014: 20) has observed, ‘the relatively few remaining jurisdictions that identify with Westminster are 
all very different to each other and behave differently’. 
 
Lijphart noted in his original (1984: 19) text that ‘[i]n nearly all respects, democracy in New Zealand is 
… a better example of the Westminster model, than British democracy’. The country demonstrated a 
clear concentration of power, being unitary, (since 1952) unicameral, and using a first-past-the-post 
electoral system that routinely resulted in single-party governments. This last feature then ended in 
1993, with a move to the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, which had knock-on effects for 
the composition of parliament, and in turn, New Zealand governments. Nonetheless, in the post-1999 
literature, New Zealand continues to be cited frequently as an exemplar of the model. As Eichbaum 
and Shaw (2011: 585) suggest, ‘[n]otwithstanding its adoption of proportional representation, [New 
Zealand] retains several elements of the family of ideas that constitute Westminster’. Indeed the New 
Zealand Parliament (2014) itself suggests that ‘[o]ur parliamentary system is known as the 
Westminster model after the British system based at Westminster in London’. 
 
Deviations from the perceived model are likewise seen in most other countries with which it is 
frequently associated, as illustrated in the top half of Table 4, which links the top 10 countries to six 
key attributes identified earlier in the paper. The attributes included are the most frequently cited, 
excluding those which are less measurable (such as ‘executive dominance’), and limiting to those 
which are clear-cut or for which reliable datasets are available.5 We depart here from Lijphart by 
selecting bicameralism as part of the model, in line with UK practice. The most widely violated 
expectation is that of parliamentary sovereignty (implying an unwritten constitution), which 
essentially applies nowhere beyond the UK. Seven of the 10 countries have a single constitutional 
document, while New Zealand and Canada have ‘constitutions consisting of multiple texts’ (Melton, 
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Stuart and Helen 2015: 10). Beyond this, most other countries violate at least one further expectation. 
Indeed this particularly applies among the countries most widely cited as adhering to the model. The 
UK itself reliably demonstrates only four of the six key attributes, while most other cases reliably 
demonstrate no more than three.  
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Table 4: Key attributes as observed in ‘Westminster’ and non-Westminster countries since 1999 
 
 FPTP Parliam
-entary 
Single-party 
majority 
government 
Parliam-
entary 
sovereignty 
Unitary Bicam-
eral 
Total 
‘Westminster model’ countries  
UK ✓ ✓ ~ ✓ ~ ✓ 4++ 
Canada ✓ ✓ ~ ~  ✓ 3++ 
Australia ~ ✓ ~   ✓ 2++ 
New Zealand  ✓  ~ ✓  2+ 
India ✓ ✓    ✓ 3 
Trinidad & Tobago ✓ ✓ ~  ✓ ✓ 4+ 
Jamaica ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 5 
Guyana  ✓ ~  ✓  2+ 
Barbados ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 5 
Ireland  ✓   ✓ ✓ 3 
Non-Westminster countries  
France ~ ~ ✓  ✓ ✓ 3++ 
Italy  ✓   ✓ ✓ 3 
Japan  ✓   ✓ ✓ 3 
USA ✓  ~   ✓ 2+ 
 
Key: ✓= yes, = no, ~= partly fulfilled (e.g. majoritarian, but non-FPTP, elections; some single-party majority 
governments; devolution of powers to regions; corpus of laws with constitutional status). Total calculated as number of 
attributes fulfilled, with additional symbols reflecting any partly fulfilled. 
 
Among our texts, Canada is cited as ‘the first modern federation to combine the so-called Westminster 
model of parliamentary government with the federal system of government’ (Burgess 1999: 2), the 
Canadian federation dating to 1867. Plus, while the federal parliament continues to use first-past-the-
post, election results since 1999 have frequently resulted in minority governments. Hence some 
authors have recently suggested that ‘[a]mong Westminster systems, Canada is the deviant case’ 
(Johnston 2010: 208). Others refer to ‘more consensual Westminster systems such as Canada’ 
(Caramani 2017: 43). 
 
Australia is also widely cited, but its deviations are almost certainly greater. It is a federation, which 
within 20 years of its formal establishment in 1901 had switched from first-past-the-post to the 
majoritarian Alternative Vote (AV) for lower house elections, while in 1948 the Senate (which was 
always wholly elected) moved to a proportional representation system. Hence although many 
continue to see Australia as a ‘Westminster model’ country, it is also widely noted that ‘Australian 
political practice has long outgrown the original model to which its founding fathers looked’ (Weller 
2008: np). Likewise various authors have pointed out key deviations from the model in India, in terms 
of both federalism and its ‘large multi-party system’, though the country retains first-past-the-post 
(Heath et al 2006: 137). In addition, Singh and Verney (2003: 11) have suggested that ‘India is unique 
in its Westminster form of parliamentary federalism’, because ‘whereas Canada and Australia retain 
the monarchy, India alone is a republic’.  
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Such deviations from the Westminster model among its best-known exemplars have been frequently 
noted (e.g. Dunleavy 2010, Paun 2011). Less noted, however, is the extent to which the model – 
despite its shakiness – has been presented as a pole to which other systems, sharing little of the 
heritage of those in the Commonwealth, may or may not adhere. These claims go beyond countries 
with an obvious shared cultural inheritance. For example, in line with authors viewing the Westminster 
model as synonymous with first-past-the-post, Kretzmer (2006: 61) has claimed that a move away 
from multi-partyism in Israel ‘could only be achieved by abandoning the system of proportional 
representation in favour of a system similar to the Westminster model’ (ibid: 65). Strøm, Narud and 
Valen (2005: 785-86) observed that in the 1960s Norway ‘looked much like a Westminster system’, 
but subsequently ‘moved away from this model’ due to a more fragmented party system, minority 
government, and increasingly assertive judiciary. Meanwhile, writing on Japan, Estevez-Abe (2006: 
633) claimed that ‘whether voters intended to do so or not, Koizumi’s 2005 landslide [had] cast the 
die in favor of a Westminster system that centralizes power in the hands of the party leadership and 
prime minister‘.  
 
Hence the Westminster model appears to be a distinctly movable feast. Deviations away from almost 
any of its key features are insufficient for a country with a certain cultural heritage to shed the label. 
Meanwhile, adopting very few such features can raise questions about whether a new country with a 
different heritage has entered the fold. Both of these usages imply that the Westminster model is a 
well-defined concept, but this appears to be far from the case. 
 
A relatively modest claim would be that the Westminster model is closer to a ‘family resemblance’ 
concept than to a ‘classical’ social science concept of the kind recognised by Sartori, which could seem 
fitting with the history of the term. After all, authors often speak of the ‘Westminster family’, referring 
to countries which share a common British parentage. Various authors hint at this kind of 
conceptualisation. For example Harding (2004: 146) suggests that ‘[w]hile one can identify essential 
features, hardly any one of these can be said, logically, to be essential in the sense that if it is missing 
in a given instance the Westminster model does not apply or has ceased to exist’.  
 
Yet in strict social science terms Table 4 demonstrates that the concept does not even meet the 
formal, albeit loose, requirements of family resemblance – in terms of a minimum number of clearly 
definable features being shared. Australia and New Zealand each consistently display only two of the 
attributes listed (and have just one overlapping: parliamentarism), while Canada and India consistently 
display only three. But, as indicated at the bottom of the table, other examples from beyond the 
traditional ‘family’ share just as many of these core attributes. France uses a majoritarian electoral 
system, is unitary, only semi-presidential, and has similar weak-to-medium strength bicameralism as 
the UK. Nowhere, however, is it suggested that France should be considered a Westminster model 
democracy. Despite the comment above, it is far from mainstream to consider Japan an exemplar of 
the model, but it is aligned on the same number of attributes as Canada and India – as is Italy. 
Meanwhile the USA practices first-past-the-post, has a two-party system, and is bicameral; but its 
system is widely presented as the polar opposite of the model. This strongly suggests that any 
‘Westminster family’ exists only in the natural language sense – of individuals sharing a common 
ancestor – rather than in formal social science terms. And for all countries – even the UK – the shared 
ancestor is now becoming increasingly distant. 
 
Some authors have suggested that certain supposedly Westminster model countries are better 
considered a kind of hybrid. Thompson (1980) coined the term ‘Washminster’ to describe Australia’s 
fusion of certain Westminster elements (notably parliamentarism) with others more akin to US 
government in Washington DC (notably a strong directly-elected Senate), and this term continues to 
be used (e.g. Bach 2003). Butler (1974) simply preferred to describe the Australian variant as the 
‘Canberra model’. More recently, Kumarasingham (2013: vi) has suggested the term ‘Eastminster’ to 
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capture the export of UK-style institutions to India and Sri Lanka, which ‘altered and adapted the 
Westminster system for their own soil’. But while these hybrid terms are intended to respect and 
reflect deviations from the original, such deviations are (at least by now) almost universal. Nearly two 
decades ago, Norris (2001: 878), suggested that ‘we are perhaps witnessing the twilight of the pure 
Westminster model, with only a few states like Barbados continuing to cling to this ideal’. Table 4 
clearly supports this view. Nonetheless, even suggesting that the Westminster model survives in the 
Caribbean is not wholly uncontroversial. Bishop (2001: 421) has described Caribbean variants as ‘in 
many respects a caricature of Westminster with the intensification of many of its least desirable 
aspects’, resulting not in the formerly-benign Westminster, but instead a ‘Westmonster’, which must 
be slayed.  
 
Conclusion  
We have followed Sartori’s (2009 [1984]) advice in seeking to ‘reconstruct’ the concept of the 
Westminster model, by reviewing its use in the recent comparative literature. Particularly when going 
beyond UK-focused studies we found that the term is frequently used with little or no definition. This 
is perhaps because some authors believe, in line with Kerr and Kettell (2006: 7), that ‘[t]he central 
features of this model are by now so well-known that they are barely worth recounting’. But our 
analysis of how the literature describes both the term’s intension (i.e. the properties with which it is 
associated) and extension (i.e. the specific cases to which it is thought to apply) shows this not to be 
the case. The model is associated with numerous properties, given varying weight by different authors. 
It is also associated with numerous countries, key exemplars of which display few of the clearly 
definable properties that are most commonly discussed. 
 
We did not conduct a full historical analysis of the literature, but it seems clear that the Westminster 
model has had different meanings over time, all of which continue to have some vestigial use. At the 
outset it described the traditions of British government in a crucial period when the franchise was 
widening and modern democracy being cemented. Some authors continue to use it as shorthand for 
the political institutions that characterise (or, alternatively, used to characterise) the UK. But the term 
is also widely used in broader comparative politics, often denoting a political system that was 
influenced by UK institutions. For some authors it is (erroneously) a term interchangeable with 
parliamentarism – as distinct from what is seen as its polar opposite, US presidentialism. For others it 
is a special case of parliamentarism, founded on a majoritarian (normally first-past-the-post) electoral 
system – or indeed shorthand for that electoral system itself. For many public administration scholars, 
the term instead denotes something about civil service culture, while others associate it with 
centralisation (notwithstanding the fact that several of the most commonly-cited exemplars are 
federal states).  
 
Alongside these fragmentary approaches, Lijphart’s (1984, 1999, 2012) interventions have been 
influential. His work made the term ‘Westminster model’ synonymous, in the minds of many, with an 
ideal-type majoritarianism. In one sense these interventions injected new life, and a new precision, 
into a an ageing and distinctly cloudy term – by suggesting 10 attributes associated with such a model. 
However this compounded the confusion, because Lijphart’s ideal type did not apply in any existing 
country, while some countries previously strongly associated with the ‘model’ did not share the 
attributes proposed.  
 
Hence while the ‘Westminster model’ may once have had a meaning (or meanings), a combination of 
conceptual confusion among authors and real-world change have seen it stretched beyond 
recognition. As Collier and Mahon (1993: 845) note, ‘the problem of conceptual stretching can arise 
not only from movement across cases but also from change over time within cases’. Both problems 
clearly apply to supposedly ‘Westminster model’ countries. By now the term has gone well beyond 
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individual cases of what Sartori referred to as ‘individual ambiguity’, to achieve a damaging state of 
‘collective ambiguity’ in the literature (2009 [1984]: 111).6 
 
Whether adhering to Lijphart’s version or not, political scientists today often reach for the term 
‘Westminster model’ relatively casually, assuming that its meaning is clear and thereby imbuing it with 
a faux precision. Practitioners, in turn, may assume that a term frequently used by political science 
academics has a solid basis. In reality, however, comparative politics scholars seem frequently to 
deploy the term either as a convenient cloak to imply that single country studies have comparative 
application, or to suggest that a rational sampling or case selection strategy was used in small-n 
comparative studies. Sometimes this may provide a cover for what is essentially a convenience 
sample, based on English-speaking jurisdictions. Indeed, some users of the term appear to betray 
limited understanding of cases beyond the English-speaking world – hence the frequent contrast with 
US presidentialism.  
 
Following Sartori, authors are often attempting to ascend too far up the ladder of abstraction, to reach 
for a broad term, but the term chosen is one with no clear empirical basis. Comparativists need instead 
to focus lower down the ladder, on the variables of explicit relevance to their analysis, if their 
conclusions are to have any capacity to travel beyond the cases at hand. Hence if studying the effects 
of first-past-the-post electoral systems, it is wholly justified to include the UK alongside the US. If 
studying weak-to-medium strength bicameralism, or the culture of large parliamentary chambers, it 
is appropriate to compare the UK with France. Of course, this is precisely what many good 
comparativists already do. In contrast, justifying case selection on the basis that cases are 
‘Westminster model’ countries risks feeding false descriptive and causal inferences, and false 
generalisation. It also perpetuates a false impression among practitioners that a meaningful ‘family’ 
of political systems exists. 
 
Language in political science and politics changes, and terms regularly fall out of use when they 
become outdated. For example the term ‘Third World’ rose to prominence at around the same time 
as the ‘Westminster model’, but many now see it as inappropriate for description of a set of diverse 
countries which should not merely be pigeonholed by reference to (previously) more dominant 
comparators (Solarz 2012). The strongest argument for common bonds between ‘Westminster model’ 
countries is one based on heritage, and hence possibly on culture. Yet continued emphasis on this 
'family' risks trapping certain countries, whose systems now radically differ, in a colonial past. Scholars 
wanting to compare systems with a shared British heritage should make this attribute explicit, and 
justify why it is an appropriate one to include within their sampling or case selection strategy. 
Otherwise, we suggest, it is time for the ‘Westminster model’ to be retired. 
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1 The graph shows the occurrence of the term as a proportion of all two-word phrases in texts captured by 
Google books from each given year (see https://books.google.com/ngrams/info). Note this is a relative, not an 
actual measure: as the number of books published has also risen sharply, the growth in actual incidence of the 
term would be far steeper.  
2 As with respect to the Google books search above, there is of course a possibility that the term is used with 
greater nuance in non-English language texts. This remains untested, but there is no particular reason to 
believe that it would be the case. 
3 More fully: a definition needed to include an explicit statement of meaning, the term being mentioned 
followed by a statement describing its significance. The statement of significance might or might not be 
followed by a list of associated attributes. A ‘full’ definition defined the term extensively, the author listing 
attributes associated with the model and discussing their functioning. A ‘partial’ definition mentioned the term 
followed by a statement describing its significance, but this could be weak or underdeveloped. 
4 Other countries were: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, 
Fiji, Grenada, Israel, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Nauru, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts-
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa. 
5 For example, we were unable to find a reliable source for which countries possess a 'neutral civil service', 
despite consulting scholars of comparative public administration. Those datasets that exist (e.g. see Kopecký et 
al 2016) are based on expert surveys and composite scales for degrees of political involvement in public 
appointments, rather than providing an uncontroversial dichotomous categorisation. 
6 Sartori suggested that ‘Individual ambiguity is a single author’s confusion’, while ‘Collective ambiguity attests, 
instead, to an infelicitous state of a discipline as such… [where] each scholar ascribes his own meanings to his 
key terms’ (2009 [1984]: 111, italics in original). 
